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ABSTRACT 
The Francis Report, which was based on the investigation of complaints regarding standards 
of care in the Staffordshire NHS Trust in the UK, was published in 2013. The Report revealed 
that while the Trust appeared to be compliant with the standards set by official regulating 
bodies, the quality of care provided to patients was often appalling.  While the Report 
constituted a ‘critical moment’ in healthcare, its findings resonated with widespread 
concern in the UK and elsewhere that healthcare is sometimes characterised by a lack of 
compassion. The Francis Report partially attributed this lack of compassion to a task-based  
culture which tended to prioritise the meeting of targets over the quality of care provided to 
patients. Older patients, in particular, were identified as being vulnerable to neglect. This 
qualitative study of hospice volunteers responds to concerns regarding the quality of 
organisational forms of care by considering how motivations to care may be sustained and 
enhanced within organisational contexts. Charitable and third sector organisations, such as 
the hospice in this study, have been identified as potentially relevant to other health and 
social care contexts precisely because they emphasise values such as altruism, goodwill. Our 
sociological approach suggests that altruism or compassion can be encouraged within 
contexts that emphasise a sociability of care. We argue that a sociability of care may be 
encouraged in organisational contexts if dominant understandings of rationality are 
extended through the incorporation of aesthetic rationality, a feminist perspective taken 
from Roslyn Bologh. This, however, would require a degree of authentic emotional 
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engagement on the part of formal caregivers which is more typically associated with 
relationships in the private sphere.     
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INTRODUCTION 
In many countries the provision of palliative care is heavily dependent on the contribution 
made by the charitable sector. This is particularly so in the UK, where independent, 
charitable hospices provide almost 80% of all inpatient hospice and palliative care (1).  There 
is a growing body of knowledge about hospice volunteers, which has focused mainly on 
volunteers’ personal motivations (2-5). The approach has generally been to consider an 
individualised model of motivation with less attention being paid to how a commitment to 
care is encouraged and sustained relationally within palliative contexts.  This absence 
reflects organisational culture in the West, which is often based on a solipsistic view of 
human nature that is neglectful of relationships. While we share the view that personal 
experiences, identifications and values are highly significant in relation to motivations, our 
attention in this paper is directed primarily towards the development of a sociological 
interrogated understanding of how motivations to care may be sustained and enhanced. 
Drawing on a study involving hospice volunteers this paper suggests that compassionate 
care requires an enlarged understanding of rationality, one that prioritises the importance 
of relationships.  From a feminist perspective taken from Rosalyn Bologh (6), we argue for 
an acknowledgement of the value of what she terms, aesthetic rationality, in engendering a 
sociability of compassion within care environments.   
 
Our approach seeks to provide a counter-balance to the notion that altruism or compassion 
are essentially qualities attached to individuals (7), a perspective that can foster caring 
environments characterised by a lack of collective empowerment (8). The model that often 
3 
 
 
prevails is one of the lone practitioner isolated from colleagues, alienated from the 
organisation and subjugated by a disciplinary culture of targets.  From this perspective, 
people working in health and social care organisations are located as motivated by a narrow 
form of defensive instrumental rationality, devoid of emotions, values and identifications 
(9).  Previous research (10) however, has shown how practitioners construct ‘ecologies of 
practice’ which are more responsive to and sensitive of service users by negotiating 
managerial requirements without being subjugated by them.  We believe that this study 
may be useful in revealing an approach that facilitates the development of ‘ecologies of 
practice’ in health and social care organisations. 
 
We acknowledge that transferring findings across diverse health and social care settings is in 
many respects problematic. Charitable hospices cannot for a host of reasons be compared 
sensibly with large publicly funded organisations.  Hospices are generally organised on a 
much smaller scale and are significantly financed through private donations and fundraising 
activities. At the same time, hospice volunteers enjoy high levels of flexibility in relation to 
the extent and timing of their contributions; the fact that their work is not related to the 
existential necessity of earning a living inevitably attenuates many of the anxieties 
associated with professional roles. Nevertheless, charitable and third sector organisations 
have been identified as politically important precisely because they are underpinned by 
values such as altruism, goodwill and a concern for the plight of others, factors which are 
increasingly being identified as vital dimensions of care (11- 13). For this reason it has been 
suggested that public services have much to learn from the third sector, particularly when it 
comes to understanding the needs of service users and communities and in gaining a 
greater ‘closeness to people’ (14). 
 
BACKGROUND 
 In February 2013, the final report of the Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundations Trust Public 
Inquiry, which had investigated complaints regarding standards of care in the Staffordshire 
Hospital, was published. The Report (15) revealed that while the Trust appeared to be 
compliant with the standards set by official regulating bodies, ‘appalling conditions of care 
were able to flourish’.  This was partially attributed to a culture which prioritised targets 
over care, resulting in a particular neglect of older patients.  The regulatory mechanisms had 
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clearly failed to ensure ‘compassionate care’, a value that had become subordinate to the 
pressures of complying with managerial targets.   
 
We suspect that the dangers of poor care will always be present in contexts where the 
values of care are obliged to cede in the face of instrumental rationality. We welcome the 
view represented in the Francis Report (15) that blaming individuals for systematic failures is 
generally fruitless, but we note that the Report advocates a route towards compassionate 
care through the enforcement of professional values associated with ‘strong leadership’ and 
‘the rigorous policing of fundamental standards’.  While peer review is identified in as a 
valuable approach towards ensuring consistency of care, understandings of peer review in 
the Report remain embedded in dominant interpretations of rationalism which are 
neglectful of relationships.  Following on from previous work (16) calling  for a prioritisation 
of the core values of care over managerial mantras and requirements, this paper suggests 
that compassionate care can only be enacted within supportive social relationships.  
 
While the Francis Report may well be regarded in the future as a ‘critical moment’ that 
exposed a ‘crisis of care’, the warning signs that something has gone awry have been around 
for some time. In 1995 The Crisis of Care (17) highlighted how the moral obligation for 
compassion and goodness was being eclipsed by depersonalised procedures and market 
imperatives in the USA. Similar problems have been unearthed in Scandinavia (18).  
 
A detailed discussion of the implementation of New Public Management (NPR) is beyond 
the scope of this paper, however, one of its unfortunate dimensions which is worth 
highlighting in this context is its tendency to retrench the ideological separation of the 
private and public realms. We suggest that this has resulted in a reinforcement of Weberian 
understandings of rationality. Weber (19) famously identified two forms of rationality:  
value rationality which is associated with pursuing abstract ideals, for example, duty and 
honour and so forth, and instrumental rationality which is directed towards the most 
effective realisation of certain ends (the value of which is not open to scrutiny). 
Instrumental rationality is most often associated with the pursuit of organisational targets 
and outcomes in health and social care organisations operating according to quasi-market 
forms of accountability. There is little space for personal emotion or personalised 
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compassion within either instrumental or value rationality.  Admittedly, care and 
compassion could be regarded as abstract values, however, the principles of value 
rationality rule out embodied and emotional responses at the level of individuals.  From a 
Weberian perspective, values are external to individuals and should be enacted with 
detached rationalism. The emphasis is on the quantifiable rather than the experiential.  
 
THE STUDY 
This study, which was conducted at a hospice in the north of England, involved six in-depth 
interviews with established volunteers.  Ethics approval for the study was obtained from the 
School of Health Care Research Committee at the University of Leeds in January 2013 
(SHREC/RP/285).The research participants participated voluntarily and, indeed, were keen 
to do so; we believe their readiness to participate may be attributable to their conviction 
that they could offer a valuable perspective on care – perhaps one which does not receive 
sufficient societal recognition.  We have used the pseudonym, Sandybank, when referring to 
the Hospice. We have also protected the anonymity of the interviewees by not using their 
real names.  Four of the interviewees worked with patients in the day hospice and the other 
two were primarily hospice fundraisers, although roles were not clearly delineated. Day-
hospice volunteers, for example, also contributed to fundraising activities, and the 
volunteers who worked principally as fundraisers also attended to other administrative 
tasks. The interviewees were women in their forties, fifties or sixties, and in most cases 
retired from full-time employment. The youngest had herself previously been a patient in 
the hospice and had a demanding caring role in her home life. While the interviewees 
appeared to have busy and full lives, their voluntary work at the hospice was central to their 
sense of self; in some cases it had been prioritised over other volunteering opportunities.  
 
This study is a small one and our findings are necessarily tentative. However, the interviews 
were in-depth, generally lasting in excess of an hour, and were supplemented by notes 
taken during several informal visits to Sandybank and discussions with the management 
team there.  
 
Our central concern when interviewing at Sandybank was to gain an understanding of what 
prompted the volunteers’ ongoing commitment to their voluntary work. A conversational 
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approach was used in the interviews in which questions such as ‘Why do you work as a 
volunteer?’, ‘Can you tell me what the rewards and challenges of volunteering are?’ and, 
‘How does volunteering fit in with your other commitments?’ It became apparent when 
conducting the interviews that the interviewees passionately held views that had been 
developed over a period of time; interviewees needed little prompting in expressing their 
views. The interviews were transcribed and subsequently returned to the interviewees to 
enable them to make any amendments or additions. The data were then analysed according 
to techniques associated with thematic analysis.  After several close readings of the data, 
initial codes were established, for example,  ‘appreciation’, ‘happiness’, ‘family’, ‘rewarding’, 
‘creativity’ and ‘support’. These were subsequently organised into linked categories or 
themes: including ‘community of practice’, ‘identity and caring’, ‘networks of support and 
relationships’, ‘blurring of the private and the public’, ‘authentic emotional engagement’ 
‘the philosophy of the present’, ‘altruistic resilience’.  
 
FINDINGS 
An authentic community 
For Weber (19) emotional involvement, including feelings of fraternity, are in conflict with 
rationally organised organisations.  This Weberian perspective of leadership as involving 
rationalised detachment is quite contrary to the interviewees’ experiences of Sandybank. 
Emphasising solidarity and togetherness, the interviewees described an informal 
atmosphere characterised by a lack of overt hierarchies. Jill who had previously worked in 
local government explained, 
And everybody helps everybody, and everybody seems to sort of know everybody’s 
else’s job at bit. So if they’re off ill somebody can jump in and do it, whereas if you 
work for the local authority, it’s your job and it’s left’.  
This sense of solidarity was inclusive of volunteers and staff and appeared to be 
consolidated in ‘after work’ recreational activities which included the Hospice choir and 
yoga group.  When speaking about their work at Sandybank, the volunteers tended to use 
the pronoun ‘we’ (far more frequently than ‘I’), possibly suggesting the absence of the type 
of competitive discourse associated with many working environments (20). While it may be 
countered with some justification that a charitable hospice works on a scale that is more 
amenable to a more personal approach than larger public service organisations, this does 
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not necessarily point to a less pressurised environment. The volunteers commented on the 
significant workloads of the paid staff at Sandybank. As Suzy, one of the volunteers who 
contributed mainly to fundraising events made clear, the culture of solidarity has been 
developed despite considerable pressures,  
It upsets me actually […] they’re very dedicated, but when I look at the amount of 
work that they do for the number of staff.  
 
The ‘community’ at Sandybank clearly incorporated the patients who were recognised as 
positive social agents that contributed to a pleasant social environment. One of the 
interviewees, Celia, who works in the day-hospice, commented, ‘I think you probably get 
your strength from the patients’.  She also spoke about the importance of humour and 
praised the patients for their ability to stay cheerful.  
Laughter is very important but it has to be from them, if you know what I mean, You 
can’t just do something silly and they laugh. You have to have a genuine feeling for 
people deep down (Celia, volunteer in the day hospice)  
Other volunteers similarly indicated that their relationships with patients were mutually 
beneficial. Words such as ‘rewarding’, ‘enjoy’, ‘laughter’ were often applied to describe 
encounters with patients.  This level of positivity could be interpreted as simply reflecting a 
veiled form of emotional labour.  The term emotional labour refers to the (commodified) 
work that is necessary to present an appropriate face in the workplace or to elicit certain 
emotions in others (21). Crucially, emotional labour is performed in the interests of 
organisations and is not associated with a person’s authentic feelings. The interviewees’ 
testimonies evoked, in contrast, what has previously been termed felt ‘philanthropic’ 
emotion work (22). In other words, their emotional contributions involved an embodied 
form of generosity based on largely genuine emotional engagement.  Put differently, 
emotional contributions were given as a gift, based on a tacit understanding that wellbeing 
may be generated within social encounters.    
 
The resilience of community 
Despite the sense of Sandybank being, in one interviewee’s words, ‘such a happy place’, it 
would be naïve to assume that working with people with life-limiting illnesses is without its 
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attendant stresses.  Indeed, Jill (involved primarily in fundraising) explained that working 
directly with patients would be, for her, too emotionally draining. Similarly, Dawn explained, 
It’s so hard and at first it was very difficult seeing them. You’d be sat with them one 
week and the next week you’d go and sit with them and you’d think, ‘well they 
looked fine last week’. But we know what this illness can do but it’s learning to go 
home and switch off. 
Suzy’s comments below point to a complex emotional ecology of happiness and sadness, 
and yet an ultimate ability to prioritise the positive, 
It’s not difficult getting up and getting organised early to come here because it’s such 
a happy place. It’s not depressing or sad. [There are] a few very sad occasions. You 
do get attached to some patients more than others, and you’re going to have a little 
cry when some of them die. But on the other hand, it’s almost a sort of pleasure to 
have known them, isn’t it? 
Previous studies have shown (23, 24) that emotional fulfilment can be associated with 
taxing circumstances if these are also shaped by opportunities to engage in practice that is 
meaningful.  This is perhaps what Titmus (25) has termed ‘creative altruism’. As Liz put it,   
I think with any volunteering, I think it’s the fact that I’m giving something back and I 
can give something back.  
When pressed on the emotionally draining elements of the work, Liz explained that despite 
a busy lifestyle which included photography, teaching and caring for a husband with MS, 
volunteering was the activity that provided her with the most satisfaction,  
If I had to put them [activities] into a ranking order, my volunteering would be the  
most rewarding and the one that I wouldn’t let go of. If anything went, it would be  
work, that would be the first thing to go. 
This level of commitment to Sandybank appeared to be related to a particular type of 
sociability that involved the whole community of staff, patients and volunteers. Ann, 
explained,  
if you wanted to  there’s always somebody here to listen to you, if you needed 
anybody, you know full well that you could phone up  even as a volunteer and say 
[…] I’m in a terrible state, can I have a word with whoever. And here will be 
somebody who would give you time if you needed it. 
9 
 
 
Ann’s comment above suggests that the values of care enacted with patients are also 
expressed within relationships with care providers (volunteers and staff). This is an 
important point and one that may be overlooked in some contexts in which practitioners’ 
responses to each other may be shaped by organisational mechanisms of disciplinary 
power. In contexts such as these the resilience of staff is likely to be undermined as 
suggested by a recent study (26). The study shows that the introduction of NPM into the 
Nordic countries in the 1990s coincided with increased problems of staff turnover and 
absenteeism, and a sharp rise in multiple health problems including depression, anxiety, 
exhaustion, musculoseketal injury and mortality. It is suggested (26) that the escalation of 
these problems within Scandinavian health services may be attributable towards an 
organisational reconfiguration that subordinates high quality care to economic concerns for 
productivity and efficiency. Conversely, developing a therapeutic relationship with patients 
through person-centred approaches has been identified as contributing to the wellbeing of 
patients and nurses alike (27). 
 
The philosophy of the present 
For three of the volunteer interviewees who participated in this study craft work constituted 
a longstanding interest which, they argued, was key in promoting therapeutic relationships. 
Liz explained that this type of activity occurs when individuals are untrammelled by 
paperwork, 
You can focus on what the individuals want to do because they will come in one day 
and some will absolutely love doing crafts, and some [will say] ‘Oh I can’t do it. I 
don’t want to do it’. And you can talk them round to doing little things, just doing 
little bits and feeding them snippets and then all of a sudden they’re creating 
something. 
This appreciation of the value of craftwork among the volunteers was not primarily related 
to the quality of product but to the creative process which was in itself therapeutic, both in 
terms of providing an enjoyable pastime and in encouraging a sense of togetherness and 
conversation.  As Dawn explained, 
We enjoy ourselves, you know, we do this and do this, and as they get used to you 
they start to talk to you about things and tell you about their life, their family and 
what’s happening.   
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The main purpose or telos of the craftwork was therefore to promote wellbeing in the 
present through meaningful activity that can be interpreted as a form of mutual gift 
exchange involving all parties.  This evokes what has elsewhere been referred to as the 
‘philosophy of the present’ (28, 29). Essentially, the philosophy of the present is associated 
with an appreciation of and ability to live in the present, whilst accepting that the future 
cannot always be controlled. People who adopt the philosophy of the present tend to view 
their lives as relational and ongoing rather than focusing on future objectives, an orientation 
that sometimes appears to be associated with higher levels other-relatedness.  What we 
draw from our findings is that caring for people with life-limiting illnesses (and older people 
and people with chronic conditions) requires an attention to present wellbeing through 
supporting the development of meaningful relationships. This often remains insufficiently 
acknowledged in organisational contexts.  
 
Towards a sense of agency – personal and relational 
The interviewees did not see themselves as individualised units whose purpose was to 
deliver goals or plans imposed from above, but as key sources of agency in themselves, and 
through their relationships with others.  When people see themselves this way, their 
commitment extends beyond what are considered normally acceptable levels. At Sandygate, 
this fosters a commitment to patients and to very necessary but time-consuming funding 
raising events. Suzy explained, 
I mean sometimes when they’ve got the ball and then the Christmas events and the 
Light up a Life, it’s just absolutely mad. That’s why I come in extra, so if I’m needed, 
just shout’.  
Suzy’s comment appears to be describing a supererogatory obligation, that is a feeling that  
one has a personal sense of responsibility (that goes beyond the call of duty).  Similarly, Jill 
described her motivation in terms that pointed to an absence of the compartmentalisation 
of life that is often a characteristic of paid employment,  
And the thing is like when I used to work, I used to think, right at the end of the day, 
everything is cleared, so you’re starting fresh [next day]. There’s no way in a million 
years that you could finish what you’re doing [at Sandybank].   
A cautionary note needs to be added here as volunteers equally spoke of the ability to 
compartmentalise their lives, although it was evident that their commitment exceeded the 
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normal boundaries associated with professional roles. Although her volunteering was 
primarily in patient care, Liz explained, 
And I watch the volunteers and paid staff work so hard [at arranging fund raising 
events].We’ve just had one on Sunday, and we did the Christmas market, and I spent 
nearly six hours there in Santa’s Grotto, but [high levels of] work they [paid staff and 
volunteers] have to put into doing it, to make those event happen.  
  
This sense of holistic involvement is contrary to traditional notions of professionalism which 
have traditionally been associated with a rationalist-instrumentalist mindset which 
compartmentalises personal life from working life.  In contrast, at Sandybank, the blurring of 
boundaries between private life and volunteering appeared to be associated with a view of 
agency as relational. The relational incorporated wider social networks that included family 
members and friends. On several occasions, the contributions of family members were 
referred to, 
I mean my friend who lives in Wakefield, she came and helped out [with the garden 
party].  Whilst me and my sisters were on the barbecue – there were four of our 
family and three of my nieces just did that (Suzy).  
 
Motivation and commitment among the volunteers clearly do not stem from a target 
culture associated with instrumental rationalism. At the same time, the volunteers’ sense of 
identification with others is not sufficiently captured by value rationality that prompts 
striving towards abstract values that are external to agents. Therefore, as a way of 
conceputalising the psychosocial environment at Sandybank we have turned instead to a 
feminist perspective (6) offered by Bologh in Love and Greatness.  
 
Before discussing Bologh’s (6) contribution, we begin by reminding the reader that  feminist 
perspectives generally reject the separation of the public and private spheres of life, viewing 
this an ideological division of life which devalues domestic work and  ‘feminine’ values 
derived from engagement in the private sphere.  According to feminist critiques (30), 
women’s voices have been stifled in the public sphere, and qualities deemed suitable for 
professional life, such as detachment and objectivity, are generally those traditionally 
associated with a ‘masculine’ standpoint (30). Specifically in relation to this paper, 
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professional life has been traditionally connected to Weberian technical rationalism which, 
as previously discussed, neglects the value of relationships.  In the discussion below, we 
draw on Bologh (6) who argues, from a feminist perspective, for an enlarged understanding 
of rationalism. Specifically, Bologh argues that ‘aesthetic rationality’ which is generally seen 
as connected to the promotion of domestic wellbeing should be incorporated into 
organisations with traditional forms of Weberian rationalism which are, as discussed above, 
associated with a detached and masculinist perspective. In this paper we suggest that the 
value of aesthetic rationality should be seen as of particular relevance in formal caring 
contexts where it should enjoy parity with traditional forms of  organisational rationality.   
    
Bologh (6) sees aesthetic rationality as a mainly unacknowledged a female form of 
rationality (in the sense that it is associated with domestic and communal relations) which is 
in the broadest sense appreciative of and responsive to beauty. This is not a reference 
merely to visual beauty but encompasses anything which ‘attracts our feelings in a way that 
we deem desirable’ (6). In other words, the ultimate gain is the realisation of a subjective 
sense of wellbeing – physical, social and emotional.  Aesthetic rationality joins together 
mind, body, feelings and senses and seeks to create a world that enriches and empowers 
people.  Activities associated with aesthetic rationality include tending to the body in 
physically sensitive ways or in invoking wellbeing through the organisation of playful of 
social activities, or simply listening attentively and responding in ways that foster a person’s 
sense of belonging. The inclusion of the emotional dimension in Bologh’s thinking is of 
especial significance as this has traditionally had little legitimacy within organisations that 
are mainly run according to Weberian understandings of rationality which discourage the 
view that emotion may be a positive force for good.  This is now being increasingly 
challenged by philosophers, neuroscientists, psychotherapists and social scientists whose 
work suggests that emotions cannot be disentangled from evaluative judgements (24, 30-
32). What these authors are suggesting in different ways is that emotions tell us what is 
important.  
 
The findings of this study suggest that much of what happens at Sandybank is based to a 
significant extent on a sociability generated through a collective and tacit identification with 
the values of aesthetic rationality.  The emphasis on the ‘beauty’ of relationships and how to 
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enhance these may be enhance through collaborative and meaningful activities together 
work towards the enhancement of present mutual wellbeing.  
 
 
DISCUSSION  
Bologh (6) sees aesthetic rationality as an approach that can engender what she terms 
‘female sociability’ (defined as sociability that is generated within domestic and community 
relations). We prefer the term ‘sociability of care’ on the basis that we consider that its 
legitimacy should be extended into the public sphere. Irrespective of the term that is 
applied, however, we feel that while it cannot be quantified or ‘commanded from above’, 
this type of sociability can be quickly sensed in an environment, such as Sandybank, where it 
informs relationships. At first glance, a ‘sociability of care’ ostensibly resembles Simmel’s 
(33) well known sociological understanding of sociability in the sense that this equally 
prioritises pleasure and playfulness. Simmel, however, sees sociability as a performance of 
playfulness by individuals whose personal interests precede collective interests. For Simmel 
the emphasis is on the performance of tact and good form. In contrast, Bologh’s sociability 
acquires values through sincerity and is produced through an authentic orientation towards 
others. The notion of authenticity is particularly pertinent to the study at Sandybank where 
the volunteers’ focus was not on the abstract but on the person at hand, seen as an 
embodied, feeling, and thinking agent.  While emotionally charged relationships may be 
draining, there is a growing body of sociologically informed literature suggesting that 
denying emotional engagement in caring environments leads to yet greater devitalisation 
(see for example, 23, 24). 
 
CONCLUSION 
Bologh (6) argues in favour of the incorporation of aesthetic rationality into the public realm 
in order to counterbalance the prevailing tendency to prioritise detached instrumental 
rationality. While Weber was aware that the instrumental rationality associated with 
modern organisations works against the development of a commitment to values and ideas 
that give meaning to life, he addressed this by turning to the possibility of charismatic 
leaders who would be able infuse values and meaning into social life.  As Bologh points out, 
this was based on the assumption of ‘patriarchal’ control, a form of leadership involving 
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obedience rather than agency. We suggest instead that a ‘sociability of care’ might be 
generated through aesthetic rationality, and that this should receive higher levels of 
recognition within public and social care organisations. This is perhaps especially pertinent 
to the care of older people and people with chronic conditions, where the emphasis on 
present wellbeing (rather than on future-oriented ‘cures’ or outcomes) should be the main 
concern. This can only be accomplished in a context in which flourishing – not merely 
instrumental - relationships are esteemed. 
 
While this study relates principally to volunteers’ contributions in a charitable hospice, we 
suggest that the findings may be of some relevance when considering professional forms of 
care in a range of organizational contexts. In the current ‘crisis of care’ there is an urgent 
need to question current understandings of professionalism and the narrow interpretation 
placed on rationality in many organizational contexts. We suggest that organizational forms 
of professionalism might be reconfigured to incorporate a recognition of the value of 
aesthetic rationality, and that this might contribute to the development of more 
compassionate care.  While it is beyond the remit of this paper to consider in detail what 
such a reconfiguration would involve in practical terms, we would briefly suggest that it 
would entail supplementing task-based approaches with the expectation that 
compassionate professionalism requires close attention to the nurturing of relationships. 
Equally, biomedical preoccupations with future outcomes – for example, the restoration of 
health –  would be accompanied by a greater recognition that compassionate care requires 
a  focus on the dignity and wellbeing of people in the present.  This greater focus on present 
wellbeing would be one which would also benefit care providers. On the basis of this study, 
we suspect that the quality of care at Sandybank is enhanced through a sociability of care 
which supports (rather than polices) the care providers.    
 
A sociability of care cannot be conjured up or enforced through the imposition of authority, 
it requires a deeply embedded change of culture that is achieved though collective 
commitment. We suggest that aesthetic rationality might be a good starting place for its 
development.Before aesthetic rationality can gain ground in the public sphere, a 
fundamental shift is needed whereby professional achievement is no longer assessed by 
criteria restricted to Weberian rationality alone. An enlarged interpretation of rationality is 
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needed, one that incorporates the aesthetic. Specifically, it is about broadening 
conventional notions of rationality to incorporate a notion of organisations as networks of 
relationships.  This is not to suggest that aesthetic rationality is on its own a sufficient basis 
for the running of an organisation, an argument that would be as irrational as the repressive 
tendency of the public sphere to reject the values of the private spheres.  What is required, 
however, is the aspiration to transcend the opposition between the private and public 
sphere and to reformulate the relationship between them.   
 
Enacting such a change would involve a profound reconsideration of what constitutes 
rationality in professional contexts and an obligation to stand up for some of the values of 
the private sphere which have not received sufficient recognition within organisational 
contexts. If aesthetic rationality is to become fully rational, this will not be achieved by 
‘specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart’ (34), but by people who are collectively 
empowered to overcome its subservience. 
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